Moral particularism lending moral permissibility to human reproductive cloning
- Anusha Mehendale
- Nov 8, 2022
- 10 min read
(This is a paper I wrote for one of my courses - Ethics of Modern Biotechnology, while I was studying at the University of Wisconsin-Madison)
A moral generalist will declare any action that violates moral principles established in the world as morally impermissible[1]. However, human societies are complex and moral permissibility of certain actions cannot be determined merely by applying moral principles, as no existing moral principles might fit the situation. Hence, a moral particularist will judge the moral permissibility of the action based on the context, rather than established moral principles[2]. The moral permissibility of Human Reproductive Cloning (HRC) has been debated in the field of bioethics. In this paper, I will argue that moral permissibility of HRC is not absolute. I will initially state my main argument that HRC is morally permissible in certain circumstances, and I will provide details regarding such circumstances, and then I will acknowledge, and address the objections that may arise for my viewpoint.
Before dealing with moral permissibility arguments, it is imperative to understand what HRC entails. HRC is a reproductive method that creates an embryo with somatic cell nuclear transfer, wherein an adult cell nucleus is fused with a denucleated embryo, and then implanted in the uterus of a woman. This results into the creation of an embryo that is a clone of the adult whose cell donated the genetic material.
For an action to be judged for moral permissibility, not being intrinsically wrong is a prerequisite. Hence, my argument will conclude that HRC is not intrinsically wrong and HRC’s moral permissibility is determined by the context. The first premise is procreation is the biological purpose of all living organisms. The second premise is human beings are living organisms. Hence, procreation is the biological purpose of human beings. The fourth premise is an action that satisfies the purpose of something is never intrinsically wrong. Hence, procreation in human beings is never intrinsically wrong. The sixth premise is any action that results into the birth of a human being is a form of procreation. The seventh premise is HRC results into the birth of a human being. Hence, HRC is a form of procreation. Hence, from the fifth and eighth premise it follows that HRC is never intrinsically wrong. The tenth premise is moral permissibility of an action that is never intrinsically wrong is judged based on the context. Hence, it follows that the moral permissibility of HRC is judged based on the context of HRC. The twelfth premise is when an action has a contextually morally right reason it is morally permissible in that circumstance. Hence, it follows that when HRC has a contextually morally right reason it is morally permissible in that circumstance.
The argument shows that there are circumstances where the reason behind HRC is morally right and hence HRC is morally permissible. To support my argument, I will explore some situations where the reasons behind conducting HRC are morally right, entailing that HRC is morally permissible in those situations. Our bodies are complex machines that run because of various mechanisms coordinated by numerous organs and organ systems. A glitch in one of the systems can lead to ill-health. An organ system and its working can be rescued by replacing the dysfunctional organ/tissue with a healthy functioning organ from a healthy individual. However, for the replacement to work it is necessary that the recipient’s body does not reject the donor’s organ. Organ rejection is usually caused because of mismatch in the major histocompatibility complexes, which basically means that the donor’s organ is viewed as a threat by the recipient’s immune system and attacked. In such situations, the recipient is not cured, and a healthy organ is lost due to rejection. Here, HRC can not only save the recipient but also prevent the loss of healthy organs because of rejections. By creating a clone, the doctors can be assured that the clone’s organs are not only healthy but perfectly match the recipient because same genomes result in matching major histocompatibility complexes. While considering HRC in this context, the outcomes are positive as no one is harmed and a life is saved. Thus, HRC is intrinsically valuable and morally right in this situation and hence, HRC is morally permissible. Here however, the moral permissibility of HRC is limited to situations where the organ donor is not harmed because of the donation and can maintain optimal health. Another such circumstance where moral permissibility of HRC can be argued for is when an individual or a couple is not able to conceive a genetically related offspring through traditional reproductive methods. This includes circumstances where one partner is infertile, one partner has a genetic abnormality that could be passed on to the offspring via gametic fusion, the mother is considered geriatric in medical terms and has a high chance of passing chromosomal deformities to the offspring via her eggs, the couple is homosexual, or a single woman wants a genetically related child without involving the genetic material from a random sperm donor. In such circumstances, HRC will produce a viable offspring that is genetically related and genetically identical to one of the parents as they originate from an adult cell from the parent[3]. Here, HRC is helping individuals who want children and are unable to conceive by traditional methods to have a healthy child and to procreate, which is a moral right of every individual. Besides, since the offspring is wanted and is deliberately planned by the parents, one can assume that the child will be treated well and with love. Hence, in this situation HRC is intrinsically valuable and is morally right and hence morally permissible.
My argument however is not resistant to objections. One might object to a premise, my moral particularistic approach, my justification, or question the moral permissibility of HRC in the circumstances that were developed in support of my argument. The first such objection rejects the ninth premise of my argument and can be stated as follows. The first premise is procreation via copulation (PVC) is the way nature intended humans to satisfy their biological purpose of procreation. The second premise is HRC is not the same as PVC. Hence, HRC is not the way nature intended humans to satisfy their biological purpose of procreation. The fourth premise is an action that does not satisfy the purpose of something in the way nature intended is unnatural. Hence, HRC is unnatural. The sixth premise is generation of genetically distinct individuals is necessary for maintaining diversity in nature. The seventh premise is HRC does not generate genetically distinct individuals. Hence, HRC does not maintain diversity in nature. The ninth premise is any action that does not maintain diversity in nature tampers with nature. Hence, HRC tampers with nature. The eleventh premise is any action that is unnatural and tampers with nature is intrinsically wrong. Hence, from the fifth, tenth and eleventh premise it follows that HRC is always intrinsically wrong. This argument declares HRC to be intrinsically wrong and entails that nothing will make HRC morally right. Hence, HRC will not be morally permissible in any circumstance. Even though one might argue that the outcomes of HRC are positive, that argument will not stand as HRC is innately morally wrong and hence can never be morally permissible.
I will respond to the objection by rejecting the fifth and the ninth premises, meaning I reject the claims that HRC is unnatural and an action that does not maintain diversity tampers with nature. The first premise of my response for the objection is PVC can result into monozygotic twins[4] [5]. The second premise is PVC is natural. Hence, generation of monozygotic twins is natural. The fourth premise is monozygotic twins are genetically identical to each other. Hence, generation of genetically identical humans is natural. The sixth premise is HRC generates genetically identical humans. Hence, HRC is natural. The eighth premise is generation of monozygotic twins does not maintain diversity in nature. The ninth premise is generation of monozygotic twins does not tamper with nature. Hence, an action that does not maintain diversity in nature does not tamper with nature. The eleventh premise is HRC does not maintain diversity in nature. Hence, HRC does not tamper with nature. The thirteenth premise is any action that is natural and does not tamper with nature is never intrinsically wrong. Hence, from the seventh, twelfth and thirteenth premise it follows that HRC is never intrinsically wrong. Thus, with this response, I was able to show that HRC’s outcome of generation of humans that are genetically identical to pre-existing humans is equivalent to generation of monozygotic twins which is very natural. Since the outcome of the two actions is same one cannot be intrinsically wrong while the other is not.
The second objection to my argument attacks my moral particularistic approach. One might say that regardless of the situation that involves HRC, creation of a clone will result into the imposition of genetic identity on another human, which will result into the loss of autonomy of the clone due to expectations and dehumanization[6]. The argument could be stated as follows. The first premise is every human has the moral right to have a unique identity. The second premise is having a unique identity involves having a unique genetic identity. Hence, every human has the moral right to have a unique genetic identity. The fourth premise is HRC creates clones that are genetically identical to a pre-existing person. The fifth premise is unique genetic identity means that a person is not genetically identical to any pre-existing person. Hence, clones created by HRC do not have a unique genetic identity. The seventh premise that follows from the third and sixth premise is that clones created by HRC are deprived of the moral right to have a unique identity. The eighth premise is any action that deprives a human being of a moral right is morally impermissible. Hence, HRC is morally impermissible. Having a unique identity is a moral right, as it gives humans freedom to make choices for themselves and be completely autonomous. Besides, having a unique genetic identity entails not being bound by someone else’s genetic legacy which might happen to clones and might harm them due to constant pressure to fit into someone else’s shoes[7]. Thus, creation of clones by HRC is morally impermissible as it harms the clone by taking away the thing that makes him an autonomous human, i.e., a unique genetic identity[8].
My counter argument could be stated as follows. The first premise is two genetically identical humans have the same genetic identity. The second premise is two genetically identical humans can be different in other aspects of life including interests, behaviors, habits. The third premise is the unique identity of a human is a combination of the genetic identity along with the other aspects of life including interests, behaviors, habits[9]. Hence, two genetically identical humans who are distinct in other aspects of life including interests, behaviors, habits can have unique identities. Since, two genetically identical people can have unique identities, they are autonomous, and no one should expect clones to be identical to donors. Hence, HRC should be morally permissible as it is creating a unique human just like traditional procreation.
One might object to the circumstances wherein I have claimed that HRC is morally permissible. The first premise is HRC creates clones for genetically matching organs for individuals in need of organs, and to provide a genetically related child to parents who are unable to/not advised to procreate by traditional methods of conception. The second premise is provision of genetically matching organs to individuals in need of organs, and genetically related child to parents who are unable to/not advised to procreate by traditional methods of conception, results into satisfaction of the wants of people. The third premise is something that is used to satisfy a want is a means to an end. Hence, clones created by HRC are means to an end. The fifth premise is any action that uses another human as means to an end is always morally impermissible[10]. Hence, HRC is always morally impermissible. This Kantian argument would claim that none of the circumstances warrant creation of clones as clones will be dehumanized and be treated as an organ bank or a genetic offspring who satisfies the deep want of people to be parents. Hence, one would claim that HRC is not morally permissible in the described circumstances.
The first premise of my response to this argument is that genetically identical people have genetically matching organs. Hence, clone has genetically matching organs to the original person and vice-versa. The third premise is an organ can be replaced with a genetically matching organ. Hence, from premise one and three it follows that a clone can donate an organ to the original person and vice-versa. The fifth premise is having someone who can donate an organ in time of need is beneficial. The sixth premise is both the original person and the clone have someone who can donate an organ in time of need. Hence, from the fourth, fifth and sixth premise it follows that both the original person and the clone are benefited. This demonstrates that clones are not being solely used. The clone and the donor can have a symbiotic relationship wherein both can be benefited by being genetically identical. I would like to respond with another argument and, the first premise is PVC involves creation of genetically related offspring for individuals who want to become parents. The second premise is HRC involves creation of genetically related offspring for individuals who want to become parents. Hence, PVC and HRC are equivalent. The fourth premise is PVC is morally permissible. Hence, HRC is morally permissible. This argument demonstrates why HRC should be morally permissible when it allows parents who can’t conceive by traditional methods to become parents. Thus, if PVC can’t be described as means to an end, then so can’t HRC.
Another objection to my argument can be stated as follows. HRC can create complications that might lead to an existential risk for the clone. Any action that can lead to existential risk is always morally impermissible. Hence, HRC is morally impermissible. This objection advocates for the clone’s safety and opposes the moral permissibility of HRC. The first premise of my response is PVC can create complications that might lead to existential risk for the child. HRC can create complications that might lead to existential risk for the clone. Hence, PVC and HRC are equivalent. PVC is morally permissible. Hence, HRC is morally permissible. This argument demonstrates that PVC also carries risk of abortions and deformities just like HRC and hence, one cannot claim that HRC is morally impermissible.
After stating my argument, acknowledging, and addressing possible objections to my argument, I would like to conclude this paper by saying that HRC can be morally permissible or impermissible depending on the morally relevant details of a particular situation. Moral permissibility of HRC can only be context based and one cannot make an absolute claim that HRC is morally impermissible.
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